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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
"\VALTER ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ARTHUR HARD:MAN, dba HARD~ifAN 
AUTO SALES, NATHAN CHILD and 
BARRUS :MOTOR COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
8580 
(Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the 
record. The parties will be referred to here as they ap-
peared in the trial court.) 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by the defendant Hardman from a 
judgment rendered against him and one Child in favor 
of Walter Anderson in the sum of $5,632.00. The case 
arose out of a head-on collision between two cars on the 
Saltair Highway .approximately 8 miles west of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on December 20, 1954. This case is one 
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of five brought by the five individuals who were in a west 
bound automobile driven by George Williams, 
An east bound pick up truck driven by defendant 
Nathan Child was on the wrong side of the road and 
collided with the west bound automobile. The plaintiffs 
in these cases have contended that Child was either the 
agent or servant of Hardman or that Hardman and Child 
were engaged in a joint enterprise and hence the negli-
gence of Child should be imputed to Hardman and he 
thereby became liable for any damages suffered. All five 
cases have been tried and the following verdicts have 
been obtained : Walter Anderson $4,632.00 ; Adminis-
trator of C. Tennyson Johnson, $43,628.23; George Wil-
liams, $78,055.00; Administratrix of George Smith, 
$30,725.32; Elwin V. 1\Iillward, $8,197.79. The first three 
of these cases are now in various stages of appeal and the 
last two cases are before the District Court on Motions 
subsequent to verdict. 
STATEl\1:ENT OF FACTS 
\V e do not believe the statement of facts contained in 
the Brief of Appellant is adequate in that it does not pre-
sent a complete picture of the testimony as developed 
at the trial. 
Defendant Hardman operated a used car lot at Sun-
set, Utah (91). Defendant Child was in the market for 
a pick up trurk and defendant Hardinan had located one 
in Tooele which he thought n1ight be acceptable to Child 
(92). On the 1norning of December 20, 1955, Hardman 
and Child left Sunset, lTtah, for Tooele, lTtah, for the 
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purpose of examining this pickup truck (79). They left 
in a wrecker truck owned by Hardman and .apparently 
employed by him in his used car and garage business ( 79). 
Upon arrival at Tooele and the Barrus ~1otor Com-
pany, the pickup truck was examined and Child indicated 
that it was acceptable to him ( 84). When questioned 
about the price, Child testified ( 80) : 
"Q. The price had not been agreed upon while you 
were in Tooele, had it~ 
Mr. Hanson: Just a moment, which price do you 
mean~ 
Mr. Roberts: The price he was going to pay for 
it. 
Mr. Hanson: You mean with-
Mr. Roberts: That Mr. Child was going to pay to 
Mr. Hardman. 
Mr. Hanson: All right. 
A. Well, it was partly agreed upon; yes, sir. 
Q. Had it been actually agreed upon~ 
A. Well, not that I remember." 
On cross examination of Child by Hardman's attor-
ney, he testified as follows ( 85, 86-87) : 
"Q. Now, when-you expected, ,as soon as you got 
home, you would pay him $500 cash that you 
had at home ; didn't you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the balance of 150 would be payable in 
ninety days, so that he would give you credit 
for it; isn't that right~ 
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A. I don't remember that. 
Q. You sure about that~ 
A. I don't remember that; it could have been. 
Q. Let's see if you could. Now, do you remem-
ber of telling your attorneys in substance-
and I wouldn't expect you to recall the exact 
words-the following: 'The International had 
Hardman's dealer's plates on it-
A. Yes, sir, had Hardman's. 
Q. Just wait until I finish reading this, and tell 
me whether you remember this: '-There 
was no conversation between Hardman and 
I about what we would do when we got back 
to Hardman's place, but I feel sure he would 
probably have typed up ''stickers'' and I 
would have driven the International on home. 
I had $500 cash at home that I would have 
turned over to Hardman at the first oppor-
tunity along with the '41 Ford. He "\\as going 
to give 1ne credit for $150 payable in about 
90 days.' Do you recall that as being your 
lHlderstanding you had with him' 
A. Yes, I do now. 
Q. So, the price you agreed on was $650 for this 
vehicle? 
A. Yes, that's right." 
The Barrus ~rotor, the seller of the pickup truck to 
Hardn1an, deliverd to hiln a bill of sale and a rertificat~ 
of title but not the certificate of registration (92): none 
of these doctunents was delivered to defendant Child 
(93). 
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Both Child and Hardrnan specifically testified the 
tr.ansaction was to be cmnpleted when they returned to 
Hardman's place of business at Sunset, Utah (80, 93). 
As a matter of fact, Hardman had not intended to deliver 
the papers until he had obtained the certificate of regis-
tration vrhich had not been produced by Barrus Motor 
Company (99). He reaffirmed that all of these matters 
were to be disposed of upon return to Sunset (99). 
Hardman also picked up at the Barrus Motor Com-
pany a jeep which he attached to his wrecker truck for 
return to Sunset ( 204). He and Child talked about the 
return trip to Sunset and who was to drive each of the 
trucks. Child testified ( 81) : 
"Q. Was there any conversation about who was 
to drive the pickup? 
A. I was to drive the pickup and he was to drive 
his wrecker truck. 
Q. Who was present at the time that was said? 
A. Well, nobody hut Mr. H.ardman and I, that I 
can remember of. 
Q. And who said it; did he say it or did you 1 
A. Well, he says, 'You drive the pickup and I'll 
drive the other truck.' 
Q. And the 'other truck,' did that have also-
that had a jeep attached to it that he was 
taking up to Sunset? 
A. Yes, sir." 
Also, there was discussion between these parties con-
cerning the manner in which the truck was to be driven. 
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Child testified in this regard as follows (81, 87): 
... 
"Q. And did he also say to you that he thought 
that what you should do was to keep passing 
each other so both of you would know that 
each of you was all right, and your car was 
all right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And do you recall telling ~Ir. Hardman, as 
you left, or got ready to leave the Barrus 
Motor Company, that you would drive the 
pickup truck, or you would follow him home, 
and he replied that, generally, one car would 
pass the other car occasionally, so you would 
both know that everything was okay? 
A. Yes, sir. 
• • • • 
Q. Do you remember telling Mr. Hardman that 
you would follow him in the pickup truck' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you recall him saying, in substance, that, 
generally, on those trips, :~ou would pass each 
other, so, if there was anything wrong with 
either car, the other one would know about 
itY 
A. Yes, sir." 
As ,a 1natter of fact, the defendants drove in the 
1nanner suggested hy Hard1nan (82). \Yhen they started 
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from Tooele, Hardman was in the lead. At Handy Cor-
ner Hardman stopped and so did Child. Child passed' 
Hardman and then Hardman passed Child. At the time 
of the collision here involved, Child was making his 
second pass as contemplated under the agreement be-
hveen the two of them (82, 209, 210). 
Another thing of importance is the fact that Hard-
man's dealers plates were placed on the truck for th8 
return trip. Hardman towed a \Villys jeep with his 
wrecker truck ( 204). 
There can be no question concerning the fact that 
Child was negligent in the manner in which he drove the 
pick up truck. There was testimony to the effect that as 
he passed the Hardman wrecker truck moving in an 
easterly direction, there were at least three cars in the 
immediate vicinity travelling in a westerly direction. 
It was necessary for the first car to move off on the 
shoulder of the road. The second car also moved off 
and w.as hit a glancing blow by the pickup truck and the 
"\Villiams automobile was the third and a head-on colli-
sion resulted. 
On this appeal it is unnecessary to go into the details 
of this evidence concerning the question of Child's negli-
gence. The only substantial question concerns the lia-
bility of Hardman for the negligence of Child. 
We will .answer the arguments of defendant Hard-
man in the order presented in his brief. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT CHILD WAS DRIVING THE PICKUP 
TRUCK AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION AS THE AGENT 
OR SERVANT OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN OR WHILE 
ACTING PURSUANT TO A JOINT ENTERPRISE BETWEEN 
SAID DEFENDANTS. 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN OR IN REFUSAL OF DE-
FENDANT HARDMAN'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
ARGr:JIEXT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT CHILD WAS DRIVING THE PICKUP 
TRUCK AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION AS THE AGENT 
OR SERVANT OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN OR WHILE 
ACTING PURSUANT TO A JOINT ENTERPRISE BETWEEN 
SAID DEFENDANTS. 
The burden of defendant Hardman's first point is 
that there was insufficient evidence to support the find-
ing that Hard1nan was responsible for Child's negligence. 
He clain1s there was no evidence of a relationship of 
1naster or servant, or principal.and agent between Hard-
nJian and Child. 
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony con-
cerning this subject requires a finding that Hardman 
was responsible for the 1nanner in which Child drove 
the pickup truck on the occasion of the collision. The 
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testimony on this subject is uncontradicted and we believe 
the question is one of law to be determined by the court, 
and Child's negligence should be imputed to Hardman. 
There can be no question that the trip to and from 
Tooele was made in the interests of the business of 
Hardman as a used car salesman. It will not do to say 
that this was .a trip in the interest of the buyer Child. 
One 1night as well say that the operation of a depart-
ment store is the business of the customers. True, the 
customer gets some advantage, but from a legal stand-
point the business is that of the seller. Hardman's busi-
ness was conducted at Sunset, Utah, not Tooele, Utah. 
From the evidence it is clear that both parties contem-
plated that the transaction was to be completed upon 
their return to Sunset .and not before. It is an easy mat-
ter to determine the position Hardman would have taken 
at Tooele if Child had said the car was his and he was on 
his way to California with it. The business of selling 
c.ars contemplates an eventual contract, contemplates 
the transfer of title and the making out of the necessary 
papers to effect those objects. We recognize that under 
the Uniform Sales Act if everything has been performed 
in connection with the sales contract except the payment 
of the purchase price, ownership is presumed to pass. 
We, however, do not have that situation in the case at 
bar. There were a number of things yet to he done. In 
the first instance, when Child was examined he did not 
remember that the purchase price had been actually 
agreed upon. He was shown a statement he had signed 
and made to his attorney in which he had stated the price 
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was to be $500 down and the balance of $150 payable in 
about 90 days. In the sale of automobiles on credit, 
written contracts are ordinarily executed by the parties. 
The form or provisions of a written contract had not 
been determined. While it appears from this statement 
that the price of the pickup truck was to be $650 plus a 
second hand car owned by Child, yet the time of payment 
or the amount of interest to be paid had not been deter-
mined. Nothing was said about the insurance that was 
to be carried either by Child or Hardman in connection 
with this transaction. Apparently no determination had 
been made as to whether or not a conditional sales con-
tract would be the type of instrument which would be 
executed to reflect the final terms of the sale. Nothing 
had been determined as to the provisions of any such 
contract to be made. 
From these considerations it can be immediately seen 
why it was that the parties did not believe the trans-
action was cOinplete, but that all matters relating to a 
final disposition of the sale was to be determined after 
the parties returned to Sunset, Utah. ~\nother thing 
of importance is the fact that the pickup, at the time of 
the collision, carried on it the dealer plates of Hardman 
which, under the statute, indicated that the automobile 
still belonged to Hardman (section 41-1-90, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953). 
We sub1nit that under this testnnony, a finding is 
required that defendant Hardman was the owner of the 
pickup truck at the time of the collision. 
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Under the statutes of the State of Utah no title had 
passed. Section 41-1-72 Utah Code Annotated 1953 pro-
vides as follows: 
"Until the department shall have issued such 
new certificate of registration and certificate of 
ownership, delivery of any vehicle required to be 
registered shall be deemed not to have been made 
and title thereto shall be deemed not to have pass-
ed, and s.aid intended transfer shall be deemed 
to be incomplete and not to be valid or effective 
for any purpose except as provided in section 41-
1-77." 
The latter section referred to provides as follows 
(41-1-77): 
"The owner of a motor vehicle who has made 
a bona fide sale or transfer of his title or interest 
and who has delivered possession of such vehicle 
.and certificate of registration and the certificate 
of title thereto properly endorsed to the purchaser 
or transferee shall not be liable for any damages 
thereafter resulting from negligent operation of 
such vehicle by another." 
None of the cases cited by defendant Hardman on 
this subject of transfer of title or ownership, relate to a 
situation similar to the one at b.ar. All of his cases are 
ones which involve a situation between the parties to the 
contract of sale or involve a question of estoppel. 
For instance in Jones v. C. I. Trust, 64 Utah 151., 
228 Pac. 896 ( 1924), the basis of the decision was one of 
estoppel. The plaintiff purchased an automobile from 
the floor of an automobile sales company. The defendant 
company financing the automobile sought to assert its 
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security title. The court stated the defendant was estop-
ped from asserting its title to the .automobile for the 
reason that it had permitted the sales company to dis-
play this car for sale knowing that prospective pur-
chasers might buy the same without any knowledge that 
someone else held the title. Also, in the Jones case the 
transaction between the sales company and plaintiff was 
a cash transaction. The parties did not contemplate there 
would be an extension of credit for any part of the pur-
chase price. Under those circumstances no contract in 
the future could be anticipated. An unconditional con-
tract for sale of the automobile had been entered into 
and title was held to pass upon the tender of the b.alance 
of the purchase price. The parties intended that it would 
be a cash transaction. 
Da~·is v. Semloh Hotel, Inc., 86 rtah 318, -il P.2d 689, 
is not in point because upon the discharge of the em-
ployee the employee imn1ediately becan1e liable for the 
purchase price of the stock which w.as fixed by the con-
tract. Here, again, the parties did not contemplate any 
future execution of a contract or a detennina.tion of an 
extension of tiine for payn1ent of price. It was to be a 
cash transaction. 
Jackson v. James, 97 Utal1 41, 89 P. ~d ~35, (1939) 
was a case involving a gift. The Court held there 
was ample evidence to support a finding that the auto-
uwhilP had been delivered to the defendant. The Court 
reviewed many of the sections relating to passage of 
title and concluded as follows: 
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"In the light of the whole chapter it is evident 
that it.s provisions were written to protect inno-
cent purchasers and third parties from fraud but 
was not intended to be controlling as between the 
parties to the trans.action. It may well be doubted 
that the legislature could make mandatory any 
such formalities as a prerequisite to transfer of 
title as between the parties. It can of course pre-
scribe such rules to be effective as to third parties 
.and it may perhaps provide that the registered 
title shall be an element in determining liability 
for damages resulting from the operation of the 
car, as indicated by Section 76." 
From this quotation and particularly from the part 
in italics it is clear that the Court w.as not speaking of a 
case or a situation where the matter of liability for per-
sonal injuries was involved. The Court recognizes the 
statutory requirements was material in cases where lia-
bility for damages was involved. In this chapter the 
Legislature is speaking of ownership of a motor vehicle. 
In these questions relating to responsibility for damages, 
the question of ownership is of great importance in ar-
riving at a conclusion as to who is liable for the injuries 
and damages sustained in automobile collisions. Section 
41-1-77, supra, conclusively establishes that in this type 
of case ownership does not pass until the possession of 
the motor vehide has been delivered and the certificate 
of registration and the certificate of title properly 
endorsed have also been delivered to the transferee. 
Then, and then only, can a seller claim he is no longer 
the owner of a car and relieved from liability for damages 
from the negligent operation thereof. Unless this is the 
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meaning to be given this statute there is no purpose for 
its existence. We again submit that under the plain 
wording of the Legislative enactments, the defendant 
Hardman was still the owner of the pickup truck being 
driven by defendant Child. 
Utah cases support Plaintiff's position that title or 
ownership had not passed to Child. 
In Hi-Way Motor Co. v. Service ll!otor Co., 68 Utah 
65, 249 P. 133 (1926) the action was apparently for 
conversion and breach of contract. Plaintiff was a dealer 
in Star motor cars and defeP-dant a dealer in Fords. 
Jensen owned a used Ford. In negotiations between 
Jensen and plaintiff it was agreed that plaintiff would 
allow Jensen $175 for his Ford on a new Star the price 
of which was $995. If plaintiff sold the Ford for 
more than $175 then Jensen was to get credit for the 
full amount received therefor. In a conversation between 
Jensen and plaintiff's manager it was stated Jensen was 
to pay the difference between the price of the Star and 
the $175 or price received for the Ford whichever was 
greater. Jensen stated it would crowd hun to pay cash 
although he could pay most of the difference in cash. 
The n1anager told hiin plaintiff could handle his note 
and it could be settled at the tiiue the Star sedan was 
delivered. The Ford was delivered to plaintiff, it found 
a purrhaser and was holding it until three wooden wheels 
could be installed. At this thue defendant, who had made 
a trade with Jensen, obtained possession of the used Ford 
The trial court held as a matter of law title had not 
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passed to plaintiff. Thi.s was affirmed on appeal and 
this court stated : 
"It is no doubt true that, unless the minds 
of Hyrum Jensen and the manager of appellant 
had fully met respecting all of the essential terms 
of the alleged contract for the sale of the Ford 
sedan and the purchase of the Star sedan, the 
alleged contract failed of consummation, and 
hence appellant cannot recover damages for a 
breach thereof, nor can it sustain an action of 
trover for the value of the old Ford sedan. It 
certainly is true that : 
" 'In order that there may be an agreement, 
the parties must have a distinct intention common 
to both and without doubt or difference. Until 
all understanding alike there can be no assent, and, 
therefore, no contract. Both parties must assent 
to the same thing in the same sense, and their 
minds must meet as to all terms.': 13 C. J. 263, 
Sec. 48. 
"Further: 
"'Where the parties have left an essential 
part of the agreement for future determination, 
it is no doubt correct to say that the contract is 
not completed.' 6 R.C.L. p. 643, Sec. 59. 
"It seems entirely unnecessary to multiply 
authority upon a proposition so elementary as 
the one here in question, and we shall refrain 
from doing so. To the .mind of the writer it is 
perfectly clear that no binding contract existed 
between Hyrum ,Jensen and the appellant. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
"For example, the que.stion of how much of 
the purchase price of the Star sedan Jensen should 
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pay in cash, how much should be settled by the 
execution of a note, and the length of time the 
note should run, were all left for future determina-
tion. All of these constituted essential elements 
and until fully agreed upon by both parties eithe~ 
one had the right to refuse the terms of payment 
which might be proposed by the other; hence, the 
contract was incomplete and unenforceable. Nor 
does the fact that Jensen left the old Ford sedan 
with appellant to be sold by it and the proceeds 
of the sale accounted for to Jensen alter the legal 
effect of the transaction. X or did it vest the title 
of the car in appellant. Such was not the intention 
of the parties and such was not the legal effect 
of the transaction as it then stood." 
"\Y e sub1nit that unCer the authority of this case 
title or ownership of the pickup truck had not passed 
from I-Iardman to Child. 
In Stewart v. Commercial Ins. Co., 11± Utah 278, 
198 P. 2d ±G7 (1948) this Court held Jackso!l Y. James, 
supra, inapplicable and that in the absence of a com-
pleted agree1nent title would not pass. 
In Sclw·artz v. TVlzite, 80 rtah 150, 13 P. 2d 6±3 
(19:1:2) it was held that plaintiff acquired no title be-
cause he had not received the certificate of registration 
required h~· Section 41-1-7:2. rtah Code Annotated, 1953. 
See abo Traders Ocncra! l11s. Co .. Y. Pc:.cific Employees 
l11s. Co., 130 Cal. . .:\ pp. :2d 158. :278 P. :2d 493. 
In none of the ahoY(' cases was a situation presented 
where the contest was lwtwet=-n the parties to the alleged 
eontrad. ri 11H'Y all present situations where third parties 
are involved just as in the case at bar. 
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Plaintiff contends that as a matter of law, defend-
ant Child was the servant, or .agent, of defendant Hard-
man, or at least they were engaged in a joint enterprise 
in connection with returning the pickup truck to Sunset, 
Utah. 
The return of the pickup truck to Sunset was a part 
of the business of Hardman. He was in the used car 
business and a p.art of that business would contemplate 
the completion of the sale and the receipt of the money 
for the pickup truck. Hence, in the consummation of 
this transaction connected with his business, it was 
necessary that the car be returned to Sunset, Utah, to 
accomplish the ultimate purpose of the transaction. As. 
established .above, the ownership of the truck remained 
in Hardman during this period of time. He was the one 
who made the determination that Child should drive 
the pickup truck. If he had asked one of the employees 
of the Barrus ~rotor Company to drive this truck, cer-
tainly Child could have made no objection to it. That 
employee of Barrus would then have become the em-
ployee of Hardman, for whose acts Hardman would have 
been responsible. It was merely a fortuitous circumstance 
that Child was present and available to conveniently 
drive the pickup truck to the destination required hy 
Hardman's business. True it is that Hardman was not 
in the truck at the time of the collision, but he wns in 
the immediate presence of the truck at all times and 
through his suggestion was in a position to control the 
driving of the truck. Before these parties left Tooele it 
was his suggestion that they continue to pass each other. 
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As a matter of fact it was in the very act of passing in 
connection with this suggestion that this collision occur-
red. Under the cases, all that need be established is that 
the alleged master or principal had the right to control. 
IIere Hardman not only had the right to control the 
manner of driving, but he in fact did partially control 
the manner of driving. 
In 60 C.J.S. 1086, Motor Vehicles, Section 436, the 
rule is stated as follows: 
"* * * Thus one driving the owner's car at 
his request and for his purposes is the owners 
servant, or agent." 
See Cannon v. Dupree, (Tex.) 294 S.W. 298; Manint 
v. Nugent (La.) 142 So. 201; Andres v. Cox, 223 :Mo. 
App. 1139, 23 S.W. 2d 1066. In Winkelstein v. Solitare, 
129 N.J.L. 38, 27 A. 2d 868, plaintiff was injured when 
a passenger shut the door of the automobile at the re-
quest of the defendant owner. A directed verdict for 
defendant was reversed. 
In the Cannon case, supra, defendant owner asked 
her brother to drive her automobile and then got in an-
other car. Defendant was held responsible for the negli-
gence of her brother. The blood relationship was not re-
lied upon as bringing about this result. The court stated: 
"When he was directed to assume, and was 
intrusted with control of the .automobile a~ a 
driver, he was, for all purposes, of a driver, her 
representative or special servant in legal view; 
and if careless, and injury resulted to occupant 
of the car, the owner was liable to the san1e extent 
.as if he were the regularly employed driver. The 
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driving was an act incident to the service, and such 
.special service was done by ~Ir. Taylor for the 
benefit of the owner of the automobile *** As a 
general rule, authority may be conferred by one 
person upon another to do specially an act for him 
without any agreement to compensate him and 
without any binding undertaking on the part of 
such latter person to execute the authority ( 2 
C.J. 420)." 
We agree with the quotations from Restatement of 
the law of Agency, but subrnit that the evidence intro-
duced in this case brings it within the principles laid down 
in those quotations and establishes the existence of the 
relationship between Hardman and Child. 
The case of Oberhansley vs. Travelers Insurance 
Company, 5 Utah 15, 295 P. 2d 1093 (1956) cited by 
defendant is not in point. The issue to be detennined 
was whether or not plaintiff was an employee in the 
orthodox sense under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Plaintiff there had recovered a judgment against the 
Pearce Auto :Mart for personal injuries sustained while 
he was riding in a car driven by Lal\iar Pearce, the 
president of that company. He was unable to collect the 
judgment because of the insolvency of Pearce and his 
Auto Mart. Plaintiff then brought an action upon a 
liability policy is.sued by defendant to the Pearce Auto 
~lart and it was in force at the time of the accident. 
The defendant contended plaintiff was an employee of 
the Auto l\iart and hence was under the provisions of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act, in which event he 
was explicitly excluded under the terms of the policy. 
The Auto :Mart maintained Workmen's Compensation 
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insurance, but plaintiff had never been reported as an 
employee on any reports concerning employees. Parts 
of the opinion would seem to indicate that plaintiff may 
have been driving the car. The introductory remarks 
in the opinion state explicitly that he was not, but was 
merely a passenger in the car. Under all of the evidence 
the trial court had made the finding that he \Yas not 
an employee under the evidence produced. This Court 
simply held the evidence supported that finding. Cer-
tainly this case does not support Hardman's contention 
that he, .as a matter of law, was entitled to a directed ver-
dict on the question of his responsibility. \Ye submit that 
this case is not analogous to the case at bar, the granting 
of a directed verdict was not involved. 
D01csett vs. Dou·sett, 116 rtah 12, 207 P. 2d 809, 
is another authority relied upon by defendant Hardman. 
Defendant there was stationed at an army can1p in Texas 
and telephoned his wife in Holladay, rtah, informing her 
that he had obtained living quarters and wanted her 
to come and stay with him and bring his car. Since 
she could not drive the car and his n1other and father 
could, he suggested she ask his 1nother and father to 
drive the car and bring her along. This they consented 
to do. The Dowsetts and a friend started on the trip. 
The father drove and the nwther. ·who was plaintiff 
in the case, sat in the front seat. The wife of defendant 
and the friend sat in the back seat. The father. blinded 
h~' the sun, drove the car off the road, injuring plaintiff. 
The court grant('d a directed Yerdict on the ground that 
plaintiff was a fellow serY.ant of the driYer and hence 
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the driver's negligence was also her negligence and there-
fore she could not recover. On appeal, plaintiff contended 
they were not fellow servants and there was no contract 
of employment between defendant and plaintiff and the 
driver. Plaintiff contended the relationship was con-
sensual and not based on contract and defendant had 
no right to control the driver of the car as to how the 
car wa.s to be driven or as to what route was to be taken. 
Defendant conceded there w.as no right of control. Under: 
these contentions it was admitted by the parties there was 
no right of control and hence a directed verdict would 
necessarily follow. Thi.s result is directly attributable to 
the contentions made by the respective parties. Also, in 
the Dowsett case, there was no question that the partie~ 
were in the transaction of any business of any one of 
them. In the case at bar the parties were in the process 
of completing a transaction within the confines of the 
automobile sales business conducted by defendant Hard-
man. 
Defendant Hardman .also seeks to bring this case 
within the rule of a prospective purchaser as exempli-
fied by the annotation 31 A.L.R. 2d 1445. That rule is 
stated as follows at page 1450 of the annotation 
"An automobile dealer is not liable for in-
juries or damage resulting from negligence in the 
operation of the dealer's car by a prospective 
purchaser who is seeking to determine whether 
he will purchase such a car from the dealer." 
'rhere is no evidence in this case that Child was 
testing or trying out the car to determine whether he 
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would purchase it. 'The evidence without dispute shows 
he was driving the car to Sunset as part and parcel of 
defendant Hardman's used car business. There the tran-
saction was to be completed. 
Under the evidence we submit it is clear that Child 
was driving Hardman's truck at his request and for his 
purposes. But if the view is taken that Child had an 
interest in returning the car to Sunset to complete the 
transaction then the least that can be said is that they 
were engaged in a joint enterprise in that each }l...ad a 
joint right of control. 
At the time they were in the process of completing. 
a sale and purchase of the truck involved, they were 
both interested in getting it to Sunset, to Hardman's 
place of business. 
As stated in Fox vs. Lavender, 89 Ut. 115, 56 P., 
2d 1049, the nature of the thing to be accomplished 
makes the trip itself a part of that purpose. 
At page 23 of his brief Hardn1an puts plaintiff's 
case inaccurately. He states the basis of plaintiff's con-
tention in this regard is that the parties had a common 
destination. Hardn1an was the owner of the truck. As 
shown above this trip and the driving of the truck was 
part and parcel of the negotiations which were taking 
place behYeen the parties. The contract was to be com-
pletely fonned after arrival at Sunset. Hence the neces-
sity of the trip. 
II.ardn1an not only had a right of control but he 
exPrcised it in telling Child to drive the truck and that 
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they should pass each other. This course of conduct 
was followed on the trip. By this method the truck was 
kept in a position where Hardman could observe the 
course it took and the way it was driven. While Hardman 
was not physically present in the truck he nevertheless 
w.as in the immediate vicinity of the truck and could 
have stopped it at any time. As a matter of fact on 
the occasion when Hardman stopped, Child also stopped. 
Hardman in his brief assumes that defendant would 
also have to claim Child would be responsible for any 
negligence of Hardn1an in driving the wrecker truck. 
This shows a misconception of plaintiff's contention. The 
only truck which both had an interest in getting to Sun-
set was the pickup truck driven by Child. That was the 
only truck involved in the proposed sale. Hence that 
was the only truck in the joint enterprise. That Hardman 
w.as driving another truck for his own purposes was 
not a part of the joint undertaking. Getting the truck-
to Sunset was the joint enterprise not getting Hardman 
there. 
Hardman lays great stress on the fact that there 
was no participation by him in the expenses of the 
trip. If the truck was his, the gas was his and was being 
used. Child contributed his time and effort. 
vV e respectfully submit that Hardn1an was respon-r 
sible as a matter of law for the negligence of Child and 
certainly I-Iardman was not entitled to a directed verdict 
on that subject. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT COMMIT'TED NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN OR IN REFUSAL OF DE-
FENDANT HARDMAN'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
Defendant Hardman under this point in his brief 
has set forth various instructions given by the trial court, 
and instructions requested by him which were refused, 
daiming the trial court committed prejudicial error in. 
connection therewith. 'Ve will take each of these con-
tentions made by defendant Hardman in the order in 
which he has presented them in his brief and answer the 
criticism which he levels against the court's instructions 
and the refusal to grant his requests. 
TRIAL COrRT'S IXSTRVCTIOX N"O. 19 
Defendant Hardman contends the trial court erred 
in giving subdivision (a) and (b) of Instruction Xo. 19. 
If plaintiff is correct in his contentions under Point 
I then no error \Yas conunitted in giving these subdivi-
sions for the reason that ownership and responsibility 
of H.ardman should have been detennined as a 1natter 
of law by the trial court against defendant Ha.rd1nan 
and so the jury could haYe found only in favor of plain-
tiff on the.se issues. 
'Ve also subn1it it was proper for the trial court 
to use the ~i1nple tenu "owner" and let the jury 1nake 
its detennination on that instruction. In a11y eYent if 
defendant I-Iardnlan desired a 1nore explicit and enlarged 
definition of owner and ownership it was incuinba.nt 
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upon him to make a proper request embodying the desired 
elements. As will hereafter appear this he did not do. 
Defendant Hardman does not contend this instruction 
was an incorrect statement of law but merely that there 
should be more of it. 
Subdivision (b) was also a correct statement of 
the law and an adequate statement of the controlling 
principles of law. If the jury found that Child was driving 
the truck as the agent and employee of and on behalf 
of and for the benefit of Hardman .and not on his own 
behalf or for a purpose of his own, it must follow that 
Hardman had the right to control Child in his manner 
of driving. This same instruction was given and approved 
in ~11 aberto vs. Wolfe, 106 Cal. App. 202, 289 P. 218 
.at 220. 
Certainly the evidence discussed under Point I would 
at least justify submission of these issues to the jury. 
HARD~fAN'S REQuESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
(A) 
Defendant I-Iardman concedes that this requested 
instruction does not correctly follow the evidence intro-
duced, (Appellant's Brief, page 32). There was no testi-
mony in the case that the entire purchase price was to. 
be paid upon the return to Sunset by the delivery of 
an old c.ar for a credit of $100.00 and the payment of 
$500.00 in cash or otherwise. This portion of the instruc-
tion assumes there was to be a cash or completed tran-
saction when the only testimony introduced contemplated 
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an extension of credit in connection with the purchase (,; 
of this truck. 
At first Child testified the price had been partly 
agreed upon but he did not remember that it had actually 
been agreed upon (80). Then on cross examination by 
his co-defendant's counsel Child was read a statement 
he had made to his own attorney to the effect that he 
had $500 cash at home he would have turned over to 
Hardman along with a 1941 Ford, and that Hardman 
was going to give him credit for $150 payable in about 
90 days ( 86). Child then testified he remembered the 
statement and the price agreed upon was $650.00 (87). 
Even this testimony to a leading question was inaccurate 
because there was also involved the delivery of a Ford 
car. 
This discrepancy alone justified refusal of this in-
struction. The penciled notations on the original request 
(33) establish that this was at least one of the reasons 
the trial court refused the instruction. He has placed 
a question mark just to the right of the inaccurate state-
ment. At the end of the instruction he has placed the 
words "not factually right." 
This request has the further fault that it does not 
correctly state the law. Disregarding for the moment 
the Statutes on passage of title and ownership found 
in the 1\fotor \ 'ehicle Code, title passes when the parties: 
intend that it should. This request states that unless 
a different intention appears title passes when the con-
tract of purchase is made. Under section 60-2-3, Utah 
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Code Annotated, 1953, this is not true unless there is an 
'Ltnconditional contract of purchase. The evidence estab-
lished there was not such a contract. The parties con-
templated completing the transaction or deal when they 
returned to Sunset ( 80, 93). The contract had not been 
completed. No written contract had been made or agreed 
upon. No time had been fixed for extension of credit. 
The form of the contract whether conditional sale or 
otherwise had not been determined. Subjects such as 
interest and insurance had not been fL"'Ced. These are 
Inatters universally and necessarily involved in tr.ans-, 
actions of this kind where credit is extended. This was 
not a cash transaction. 
After the first sentence the request abandons any 
need for the jury to find the intention of the parties. 
This last portion of the request would have informed the 
jury that if it found Child after an inspection of the 
truck expressed satisfaction with it, said he would buy 
it for $650.00 and Hardman paid Barrus for the truck 
and delivered it to Child, then Child and not Hardman 
would be the owner. This would not conclusively establish 
an intention by both parties that title should p.ass in 
view of the testimony by both that the deal was not 
to be completed until the return to Sunset and in view 
of the further fact this was not to be a ca.sh transaction 
but would involve an extension of credit with the various 
terms which would have to be .agreed upon before there 
would come into existence an unconditional or completed 
contract of sale. 
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When the requirements of sections 41-1-71 and 77 
are considered the requested instruction is obviously an 
inc·orrect statement. Also the use of Hardman's plates 
was at least evidence that the parties intended that 
l T ardman should remain the owner until Sunset was 
reached. 
HARD:\[AX'S REQL"ESTED IXSTRrCTIOXS 
XL"~IBERS 6 and 6(C) 
These requests express various notions on \Yhat 
should be found to impute Child's negligence to Hard-
man. On each instruction the trial court noted that the 
matter "·as given in another wa:·, or in another instruc-
tion, (31, 35). \Ye submit the matter herein requested 
was adequately covered by Instruction Xo. 19 subdin-
sion(b). 
Here again, under Point I. no error was committed 
because defendant Hardn1an would be responsible as 
a matter of law for Child's negligence. 
IIARD:\IAX'S REQUESTED IXSTRUCTIOX 
NO. 6 (B) 
This has the san1e inaccuracies as noted in Hard-
man's Reque~t No.6 (A), supra. It presupposes evidence 
that Child was to pay the purchase price on .arrh·al 
at Sunset. This was not to be a cash transaction. This 
n'qnPst also inaccurate}~· states the la"· for tl1e reason 
that the jury under this request is not required to con-
si<lPr tlw intention of thr p.arties on the question of when 
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title passed. The same arguments made concerning Hard-
man's requested Instruction No. 6 (A) are applicable 
here. 
HARD11AN'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NO.7 (A) 
By this instruction defendant Hardman sought to 
raise an issue covering the situation where a prospective 
purchaser is driving .an automobile. As indicated by 
the trial court in his notation on the original request 
( 36) "Not given-outside issues and evidence." Defendant 
Hardman's contention was that Child was driving his 
own car for his own purposes. Plaintiff's position was 
that Child was driving Hardman's truck in furtherance 
of Hardman's business. 
The rule Hardman here sought to make applicable 
relates to a situation where the prospective purchaser 
is trying out or testing the car and exemplified by the 
annotation 31 A.L.R. 2d 1445 and there is no evidence 
making this rule applicable. 
\Ye submit Instruction No. 19 adequately covered 
the contentions of the parties. Point I herein also estab-
lishes there was no error in this refusal. 
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
The complained of portion of this instruction on 
damages permitted the jury to take into consideration 
mental .and physical pain and suffering which plaintiff 
might probably endure in the future. 
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Plaintiff suffered mutiple bruises and abrasions all 
over his body (167), fractured ribs from the third to 
the sixth on the left side ( 168) and which punctured 
his lung (169), a he1natoma from his hip to his knee 
on the left leg (170) and a hematoma on his right shin. 
(171). 
Plaintiff was examined by Dr. ::\!arion B. Noyes, 
his attending physician, just two days before the trial. 
At that time he found plaintiff still had some soreness 
in the left rib cage and in the left side. In the doctor's 
opinion, plaintiff "may have some residual soreness like 
any person will after a fractured or injured area" (112). 
He testified (173): 
"Well, I don't expect it to last too long. I 
don't think there is any injury there that is going 
to be disabling from that standpoint, except resid-
ual soreness; some aching occasionally. Smnetimes 
it varies with the weather and one thing and an-
other, what they do. Any fracture does." 
. . . . . . . . . ~ 
"He may have occasional aching and paining 
intermittentlY from tilne to time over the original 
injuries, but· it is pretty hard for any person to 
prophesy on that." 
Plaintiff in describing his present condition, de-
scribed the mental effects fr01n whieh he was suffering 
at the time of trial. He also testified his hip and chest 
still bothered hin1 (187, 188). 
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From this evidence the jury could find that he would 
suffer some mental and physical pain in the future and 
should be able to take this into consideration in assessing 
damages. This condition would certainly not stop on 
the day of trial but would continue for some time in 
the future and the jury should he entitled to take this 
into consideration in determining the amount of damages 
to which plaintiff was entitled. 
On the matter of loss of bodily function, it should 
be observed that the trial court eliminated from plain-
tiff's request No. 8 ( 23) consideration of loss of bodily 
function in assessing damages. Just who would tamper 
with the court's instructions is not disclosed. Certainly the 
trial judge, after eliminating this paragraph from plain-
tiff's request, would have eliminated any reference to 
this subject in the instructions given and he did this 
by placing an ink line through the portion of the instruc-
tion which mentioned bodily function. The record does 
not sustain defendant's assertion. 
Instruction No. 21 (B) (.apparently defendant Hard-
man's Request No. 9, see R. 58, the Court adding the 
word "permanent'') instructed the jury there was no 
evidence of permanent loss of bodily function, or per-
manent disability. There was no error here. 
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
By thi.s instruction the jury was informed that if 
Child drove the truck when he knew, or in the exercise of 
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reasonable care should have known, there was some de-
fect in the tire or tube which made driving on the high-
way dangerous to others, then he was negligent and if 
such negligence proximately caused injuries to plain-
tiff then a verdict should be returned for plaintiff and 
against Child ( 49). 
Defendant Hardman in his cross-complaint against 
the Barrus Motor Company .alleged that company \Yas 
negligent in equipping the truck with a right rear tire 
and tube which it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should have known was defective and likely to fail 
and which caused Child to lose control of the truck (11). 
Defendant Hardman introduced testimony through his 
expert Robert ~I. Bletzacher, that the tire and tube were 
defective and had been for several miles before the 
collision ( 226-230). 
Louise Boyer, a witness called by plaintiff, testified 
that she was driving an autmnobile in the same direction 
as Child and in1n1ediately behind hun for son1e distance 
( 14J). As Child drove. his truck kept swerving to the 
right side of the road and on to the gr.avel shoulder (1±3). 
If the right rear tire were running low it would tend to 
pull truck in that direction .. A jur~- could find this indi-
cated smnething was wrong with the tire or tube and 
<·ertainly ~hould havt' given notice to Child that some-
thing wa~ \\Tong wPil before the collision occurred. The 
giving of this instruction is supported by the e·ddence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant Hardman was conducting his used car 
business in effecting a s.ale, partially on credit, of a 
truck to defendant Child. He requested Child to drive 
the truck to Sunset, Utah, where the deal was to be 
completed. He suggested the manner of travel. We sub-
mit that under these circumstances defendant Hardman 
is responsible as a matter of law for any negligence of 
defendant Child. 
In any event, the entire matter was submitted to 
the jury under proper instructions and it found for 
plaintiff. 
We submit the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
By Brigham E. Roberts 
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM 
By Leonard W. Elton 
Counsel for Respondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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